Ceo selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis

Edward J. Zajac*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

268 Scopus citations

Abstract

This study seeks to extend and unify a set of research issues relating to CEO selection, succession, compensation, and firm performance. The study offers a model of these issues from a combined agency and organizational perspective, and tests the model using archival data and perceptual data from survey responses from 118 CEOs of the largest U.S. corporations. The results suggest that several CEO issues are significant predictors of variation in firm performance, supporting the paper's arguments for (1) a reinterpretation of the insiderfoutsider CEO distinction, (2) the relevance of CEO succession planning, and (3) the importance of CEOs' perceptions of the linkage between their personal wealth and firm wealth.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)217-230
Number of pages14
JournalStrategic Management Journal
Volume11
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1990

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management

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