Chapter 12 Incentive models of the defense procurement process

William P. Rogerson

doi:10.1016/S1574-0013(05)80014-6

Chapter 12 Incentive models of the defense procurement process

William P. Rogerson^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

Economic theorists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing models of closely related incentive contracting problems that arise in the study of public procurement, private procurement, regulation, the theory of the firm, the theory of organizations, and managerial compensation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the incentive models literature as it applies to defense procurement.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	309-346
Number of pages	38
Journal	Handbook of Defense Economics
Volume	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0013(05)80014-6
State	Published - 1995

Keywords

R&D
auctions
competition
contracts
defense procurement
economies of scale
incentives
innovation
moral hazard
principal agent models
strategic behavior

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Political Science and International Relations

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10.1016/S1574-0013(05)80014-6

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abstract = "Economic theorists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing models of closely related incentive contracting problems that arise in the study of public procurement, private procurement, regulation, the theory of the firm, the theory of organizations, and managerial compensation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the incentive models literature as it applies to defense procurement.",

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AB - Economic theorists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing models of closely related incentive contracting problems that arise in the study of public procurement, private procurement, regulation, the theory of the firm, the theory of organizations, and managerial compensation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the incentive models literature as it applies to defense procurement.

KW - R&D

KW - auctions

KW - competition

KW - contracts

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KW - economies of scale

KW - incentives

KW - innovation

KW - moral hazard

KW - principal agent models

KW - strategic behavior

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JO - Handbook of Defense Economics

JF - Handbook of Defense Economics

ER -

Chapter 12 Incentive models of the defense procurement process

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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