Chapter 12 Incentive models of the defense procurement process

William P. Rogerson*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

24 Scopus citations

Abstract

Economic theorists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing models of closely related incentive contracting problems that arise in the study of public procurement, private procurement, regulation, the theory of the firm, the theory of organizations, and managerial compensation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the incentive models literature as it applies to defense procurement.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)309-346
Number of pages38
JournalHandbook of Defense Economics
Volume1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1995

Keywords

  • R&D
  • auctions
  • competition
  • contracts
  • defense procurement
  • economies of scale
  • incentives
  • innovation
  • moral hazard
  • principal agent models
  • strategic behavior

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

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