@article{2f621d81dd2b4c648cb974f238ae2e8a,
title = "Chapter 2 The theory of the firm",
author = "Holmstrom, {Bengt R.} and Jean Tirole",
note = "Funding Information: 2.1. Incomplete contracts 2.2. Information flows and incomplete contracts 2.3. Reputation 2.4. Concluding remark 3. Capital structure 3.1. The incentive argument 3.2. The signalling argument 3.3. The control argument 3.4. Concluding remark 4. The separation of ownership and control 4.1. Internal discipline 4.2. Labor market discipline 4.3. Product market discipline 4.4. Capital market discipline 4.5. Implications for firm behavior 4.6. The hazards of a black-box view of the firm 4.7. Concluding remark 5. Internal hierarchies 5.1. Hierarchies as information systems 5.2. Supervision in hierarchies *Support from NSF and the Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank Jeff Borland, Joel Demski, Bob Gibbons, Oliver Hart, Paul Milgrom, John Moore and Richard Schmalensee for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.",
year = "1989",
doi = "10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01005-8",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "1",
pages = "61--133",
journal = "Handbook of Industrial Organization",
issn = "1573-448X",
publisher = "Elsevier",
}