@inbook{4f7b0e1f3339468c999f4b77a7ff2be8,
title = "Chapter 7 Mechanism design for the environment",
abstract = "We argue that when externalities such as pollution are nonexcludable, agents must be compelled to participate in a {"}mechanism{"} to ensure a Pareto-efficient outcome. We survey some of the main findings of the mechanism-design (implementation-theory) literature - such as the Nash implementation theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, and the Arrow/d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet mechanism - and consider their implications for the environment, in particular the reduction of aggregate emissions of pollution. We consider the cases of both complete and incomplete information.",
keywords = "D6, D7, H4, Q2, Q3, asymmetric information, implementation, mechanism design, public goods",
author = "Sandeep Baliga and Eric Maskin",
year = "2003",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/S1574-0099(03)01012-X",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9780444500632",
series = "Handbook of Environmental Economics",
publisher = "Elsevier",
pages = "305--324",
booktitle = "Environmental Degradation and Institutional Responses",
}