Abstract
We augment the standard Crawford-Sobel (1982, Econometrica50, 1431-1451) model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages. The issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-16 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 91 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 2000 |
Funding
1We are grateful to the referees and an associate editor for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Austen-Smith is also grateful to the NSF for support under Grant SBR-9804877.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics