Abstract
We analyze data from a field experiment in which an auto repair firm provided checklists to mechanics and monitored their use. Revenue was 20 percent higher during the experiment, and the effect is equivalent to that of a 1.6 percentage point (10 percent) commission increase. Checklists appear to boost productivity by serving both as a memory aid and a monitoring technology. Despite the large benefits to the firm, mechanics did not use checklists without the firm directly monitoring their use. We show that a moral hazard can explain why mechanics do not otherwise adopt checklists.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 136-168 |
Number of pages | 33 |
Journal | American Economic Journal: Applied Economics |
Volume | 7 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2015 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
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Dive into the research topics of 'Checklists and worker behavior: A field experiment'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Datasets
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Replication data for: Checklists and Worker Behavior: A Field Experiment
Jackson, C. K. (Creator) & Henry, S. (Contributor), ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2015
DOI: 10.3886/e113604v1, https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/113604/version/V1/view
Dataset
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Replication data for: Checklists and Worker Behavior: A Field Experiment
Jackson, C. K. (Creator) & Henry, S. (Contributor), ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2015
DOI: 10.3886/e113604, https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/113604
Dataset