Chilling, settlement, and the accuracy of the legal process

Ezra Friedman, Abraham L. Wickelgren

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    7 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    In this article, we ask the basic question: Is it necessarily the case that allowing or promoting settlement of lawsuits enhances social welfare? Our answer is not necessarily; there are circumstances where actually prohibiting settlement generates more social welfare than allowing it. Settlement can lower social welfare because it reduces the accuracy of legal outcomes. Reducing this accuracy reduces the ability of the law to deter harmful activity without chilling legitimate activity that might be mistaken for harmful activity. In some circumstances, the welfare loss from the chilling of legitimate activity can outweigh the gains from litigation cost savings, even if there are no restrictions on the damage rule. (JEL K00, K41, D82, C78) The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)144-157
    Number of pages14
    JournalJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
    Volume26
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 1 2010

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
    • Law

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Chilling, settlement, and the accuracy of the legal process'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this