Church and state

The separation of church and state is generally taken to be a requirement of constitutional democracies. However, there is little agreement on the precise meaning of the ideal of separation. Some liberal conceptions of democratic legitimacy interpret the ideal of separation such that religious beliefs and reasons should be excluded from political justification. This exclusivist view raises fears that a commitment to liberal democracy is suitable only for secular citizens and religious citizens who are practical atheists, but not for genuinely religious citizens. Against this view, liberal critics argue that the democratic ideal of equal treatment requires the inclusion of religious reasons on equal footing with secular reasons in political deliberation. This inclusivist view, however, raises fears that a commitment to democracy is suitable only for members of religious majorities. For, according to this view, a majority of religious citizens could impose coercive policies on secular citizens or citizens of different faiths without any obligation to give them reasons that they can reasonably accept. Against both views, I defend a conception of political justification and democratic legitimacy that does not rely on the religious-secular distinction in order to show how the normative commitments of constitutional democracies can be reflectively endorsed by all democratic citizens, whether religious or secular.