Coalition bargaining in four games that include a veto player

J. Keith Murnighan*, Eugene Szwajkowski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Tested the predictions of 3 models of coalition behavior. 120 graduate students played each of 4 games, rotating among the 5 player positions (including a veto player) between games. The games were played under 1 of 3 time pressure/default conditions: (a) no time pressure, (b) a condition such that the constant payoff to coalitions was lost if an agreement was not reached in 3 attempts, and (c) a condition such that the payoff for no agreement was fixed at 60 points for the veto player and 10 for the other players. The veto players' payoffs varied over games and tended to increase as play continued, at times approaching the entire payoff. Thus, the weighted probability (S. S. Komorita, 1974) and Roth-Shapley (A. E. Roth, 1977; L. S. Shapley, 1953) models were not supported; the core model received some support. The default conditions had little effect. The likelihood of socially beneficial behavior in competitively motivating situations is discussed. (30 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1933-1946
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Personality and Social Psychology
Volume37
Issue number11
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 1979

Fingerprint

coalition
Students
graduate
veto player
student
time

Keywords

  • time pressure/default condition of games with veto player, predictability of coalition behavior models, college students

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Psychology
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Murnighan, J. Keith ; Szwajkowski, Eugene. / Coalition bargaining in four games that include a veto player. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1979 ; Vol. 37, No. 11. pp. 1933-1946.
@article{49b0d311d19d456cbcdc6fd767d9edb1,
title = "Coalition bargaining in four games that include a veto player",
abstract = "Tested the predictions of 3 models of coalition behavior. 120 graduate students played each of 4 games, rotating among the 5 player positions (including a veto player) between games. The games were played under 1 of 3 time pressure/default conditions: (a) no time pressure, (b) a condition such that the constant payoff to coalitions was lost if an agreement was not reached in 3 attempts, and (c) a condition such that the payoff for no agreement was fixed at 60 points for the veto player and 10 for the other players. The veto players' payoffs varied over games and tended to increase as play continued, at times approaching the entire payoff. Thus, the weighted probability (S. S. Komorita, 1974) and Roth-Shapley (A. E. Roth, 1977; L. S. Shapley, 1953) models were not supported; the core model received some support. The default conditions had little effect. The likelihood of socially beneficial behavior in competitively motivating situations is discussed. (30 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).",
keywords = "time pressure/default condition of games with veto player, predictability of coalition behavior models, college students",
author = "Murnighan, {J. Keith} and Eugene Szwajkowski",
year = "1979",
month = "11",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.1933",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "37",
pages = "1933--1946",
journal = "Journal of Personality and Social Psychology",
issn = "0022-3514",
publisher = "American Psychological Association Inc.",
number = "11",

}

Coalition bargaining in four games that include a veto player. / Murnighan, J. Keith; Szwajkowski, Eugene.

In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 37, No. 11, 01.11.1979, p. 1933-1946.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Coalition bargaining in four games that include a veto player

AU - Murnighan, J. Keith

AU - Szwajkowski, Eugene

PY - 1979/11/1

Y1 - 1979/11/1

N2 - Tested the predictions of 3 models of coalition behavior. 120 graduate students played each of 4 games, rotating among the 5 player positions (including a veto player) between games. The games were played under 1 of 3 time pressure/default conditions: (a) no time pressure, (b) a condition such that the constant payoff to coalitions was lost if an agreement was not reached in 3 attempts, and (c) a condition such that the payoff for no agreement was fixed at 60 points for the veto player and 10 for the other players. The veto players' payoffs varied over games and tended to increase as play continued, at times approaching the entire payoff. Thus, the weighted probability (S. S. Komorita, 1974) and Roth-Shapley (A. E. Roth, 1977; L. S. Shapley, 1953) models were not supported; the core model received some support. The default conditions had little effect. The likelihood of socially beneficial behavior in competitively motivating situations is discussed. (30 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).

AB - Tested the predictions of 3 models of coalition behavior. 120 graduate students played each of 4 games, rotating among the 5 player positions (including a veto player) between games. The games were played under 1 of 3 time pressure/default conditions: (a) no time pressure, (b) a condition such that the constant payoff to coalitions was lost if an agreement was not reached in 3 attempts, and (c) a condition such that the payoff for no agreement was fixed at 60 points for the veto player and 10 for the other players. The veto players' payoffs varied over games and tended to increase as play continued, at times approaching the entire payoff. Thus, the weighted probability (S. S. Komorita, 1974) and Roth-Shapley (A. E. Roth, 1977; L. S. Shapley, 1953) models were not supported; the core model received some support. The default conditions had little effect. The likelihood of socially beneficial behavior in competitively motivating situations is discussed. (30 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).

KW - time pressure/default condition of games with veto player, predictability of coalition behavior models, college students

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0011469950&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0011469950&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.1933

DO - 10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.1933

M3 - Article

VL - 37

SP - 1933

EP - 1946

JO - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

JF - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

SN - 0022-3514

IS - 11

ER -