Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods

Wojciech Olszewski*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations


I study coalition strategy-proof implementation in public goods environments where agents may be excluded from enjoying the public good. I characterize individually rational, coalition strategy-proof mechanisms with the Equal Treatment of Equals property and prove that Moulin's serial mechanism Pareto-dominates every continuous mechanism in this class.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)88-114
Number of pages27
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2004


  • Coalition strategy-proof mechanism
  • Excludable public good

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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