TY - JOUR
T1 - Coalitions in decision-making groups
T2 - Organizational analogs
AU - Murnighan, J. Keith
N1 - Funding Information:
I gratefully acknowledge the comments and contributions of Kenneth Bettenhausen, John Blackmore, Thomas Hamilton, Marcia Kassner, Carol T. Kulik, Michael Malouf, Susan O’Brien, Greg R. Oldham, Alvin E. Roth, Gerrit Wolf, and two anonymous reviewers during various stages of this project. Portions of the paper were completed during a visit at the University of Warwick, School of Industrial and Business Studies, Coventry, England; their assistance is also appreciated. Work on this project was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation. Send reprint requests to J. Keith Murnighan, Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois, 350 Commerce Building (West), Champaign, IL 61820.
PY - 1985/2
Y1 - 1985/2
N2 - The literature on organizations has long focused on the concept of coalition behavior. An experiment on coalition formation was designed as a simulation of organizational decision-making groups. Previous research and a variety of game theoretic and social psychological models of coalition behavior provided strong empirical and theoretical bases for the study. Groups of masters students interacted in four sessions that manipulated the power of the five actors in each group. Results were compared to previous findings and were used to evaluate the theories. The findings suggest that (1) revenge was not often used by the players in these groups; (2) social pressure and the weak players' ability to communicate depressed the strongest players' outcomes; and (3) S.S. Komorita and J. Chertkoff's (1973 Psychological Review, 80, 149-162) Bargaining theory and the Roth-Shapley value (A. E. Roth, 1977 Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 16, 153-160; Econometrica, 45, 654-657; L. S. Shapley, 1953 in H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to thefs theory of games (Vol. 2), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) predicted coalition outcomes better than the other models tested. The implications for organizations and their members are discussed.
AB - The literature on organizations has long focused on the concept of coalition behavior. An experiment on coalition formation was designed as a simulation of organizational decision-making groups. Previous research and a variety of game theoretic and social psychological models of coalition behavior provided strong empirical and theoretical bases for the study. Groups of masters students interacted in four sessions that manipulated the power of the five actors in each group. Results were compared to previous findings and were used to evaluate the theories. The findings suggest that (1) revenge was not often used by the players in these groups; (2) social pressure and the weak players' ability to communicate depressed the strongest players' outcomes; and (3) S.S. Komorita and J. Chertkoff's (1973 Psychological Review, 80, 149-162) Bargaining theory and the Roth-Shapley value (A. E. Roth, 1977 Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 16, 153-160; Econometrica, 45, 654-657; L. S. Shapley, 1953 in H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to thefs theory of games (Vol. 2), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) predicted coalition outcomes better than the other models tested. The implications for organizations and their members are discussed.
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U2 - 10.1016/0749-5978(85)90042-1
DO - 10.1016/0749-5978(85)90042-1
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:46549098788
SN - 0749-5978
VL - 35
SP - 1
EP - 26
JO - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
JF - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
IS - 1
ER -