Collective choice in dynamic public good provision

T. Renee Bowen, George Georgiadis, Nicolas S. Lambert

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project and collectively decide its scale. A larger scale requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scale, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent's preferred scale shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent's degree of efficiency is a key determinant of control over the project scale. From a welfare perspective, it may be desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)243-298
Number of pages56
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume11
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2019

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Collective choice
Dictatorship
Unanimity
Decision rights
Heterogeneous agents

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Bowen, T. Renee ; Georgiadis, George ; Lambert, Nicolas S. / Collective choice in dynamic public good provision. In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2019 ; Vol. 11, No. 1. pp. 243-298.
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Collective choice in dynamic public good provision. / Bowen, T. Renee; Georgiadis, George; Lambert, Nicolas S.

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 11, No. 1, 01.02.2019, p. 243-298.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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