Collusion in Industrial Economics: A comment

Robert H. Porter

doi:10.1007/s10842-005-4873-8

Collusion in Industrial Economics: A comment

Robert H. Porter^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

This note comments on Feuerstein's (2005) summary of the literature on collusion in infinitely repeated games. It specifically addresses firm asymmetries and settings in which punishments can be asymmetric. Changes in competition policy such as exception from punishment for the first but only the first compliant and the recent practice to study the effects of mergers after the fact, will provide interesting material for testing the theoretical predictions.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	231-234
Number of pages	4
Journal	Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
Volume	5
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-005-4873-8
State	Published - Dec 2005

Keywords

Cartel
Collusion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Industrial relations

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10.1007/s10842-005-4873-8

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abstract = "This note comments on Feuerstein's (2005) summary of the literature on collusion in infinitely repeated games. It specifically addresses firm asymmetries and settings in which punishments can be asymmetric. Changes in competition policy such as exception from punishment for the first but only the first compliant and the recent practice to study the effects of mergers after the fact, will provide interesting material for testing the theoretical predictions.",

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AB - This note comments on Feuerstein's (2005) summary of the literature on collusion in infinitely repeated games. It specifically addresses firm asymmetries and settings in which punishments can be asymmetric. Changes in competition policy such as exception from punishment for the first but only the first compliant and the recent practice to study the effects of mergers after the fact, will provide interesting material for testing the theoretical predictions.

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Collusion in Industrial Economics: A comment

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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