Collusion in Industrial Economics: A comment

Robert H. Porter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations


This note comments on Feuerstein's (2005) summary of the literature on collusion in infinitely repeated games. It specifically addresses firm asymmetries and settings in which punishments can be asymmetric. Changes in competition policy such as exception from punishment for the first but only the first compliant and the recent practice to study the effects of mergers after the fact, will provide interesting material for testing the theoretical predictions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)231-234
Number of pages4
JournalJournal of Industry, Competition and Trade
Issue number3-4
StatePublished - Dec 2005


  • Cartel
  • Collusion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial relations


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