Collusion, renegotiation and implementation

Sandeep Baliga*, Sandro Brusco

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


We study the implementation problem for exchange economies when agents can renegotiate the outcome assigned by the planner and can collude. We focus on the use of sequential mechanisms and present a simple sufficient condition for implementation with renegotiation in strong perfect equilibrium. We present an application to optimal risk sharing, showing that the possibility of collusion and renegotiation does not in general prevent the implementation of efficient allocations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)69-83
Number of pages15
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2000

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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