Committee design with endogenous information

Nicola Persico*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

146 Scopus citations


Identical agents gather costly information, and then aggregate it through voting. Because information is a public good, information is underprovided relative to the social optimum. A "good" voting rule must give incentives to acquire information, as well as aggregate information efficiently. A voting rule that requires a large plurality (in the extreme, unanimity) to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each agent is sufficiently accurate. This result is independent of the preferences of voters and of the cost of information.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)165-191
Number of pages27
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2004

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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