Abstract
Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents commonly learn the value of the parameter, i. e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically distributed across time (but not necessarily across agents), the answer is yes (Cripps et al., Econometrica, 76(4):909-933, 2008). This paper explores the implications of allowing the signals to be dependent over time. We present a counterexample showing that even extremely simple time dependence can preclude common learning, and present sufficient conditions for common learning.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 55-98 |
Number of pages | 44 |
Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
Volume | 42 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2013 |
Keywords
- Common belief
- Common learning
- Private beliefs
- Private signals
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty