Communicating judicial retirement

Álvaro Bustos; Tonja Jacobi

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2015.06.004

Communicating judicial retirement

Álvaro Bustos^*, Tonja Jacobi

^*Corresponding author for this work

Pritzker School of Law

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Justices can strategically shape perceptions of their likely retirements, and so influence the President and Senate in choosing an ideologically compatible replacement. Relatively new justices can vote insincerely to affect how their ideologies are perceived, but their strategies are shaped by older justices' expected retirement probabilities. We show that "strong messages" of retirement are likely when new justices vote insincerely and the new and retiring justices' ideologies are aligned. "Weak messages" are more likely when new justices vote sincerely or, if they do vote insincerely, the old and new justices' ideologies are unaligned.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	107-118
Number of pages	12
Journal	International Review of Law and Economics
Volume	43
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2015.06.004
State	Published - Aug 1 2015

Funding

We are thankful for comments provided by Ezra Friedman, Peter Dicola and attendees at the 2013 American Law and Economics Association meeting 2013 (Vanderbilt University); the 2014 Latinoamerican Law and Economics Association meeting 2014 (Universidad Francisco Marroquín). Bustos also thanks Fondecyt Grant no. 1141235 for funding.

Keywords

Communication
Justices
K10
K30
K40
Messages
Nominations
Retirement
Signaling
Supreme Court

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Law

Access to Document

10.1016/j.irle.2015.06.004

Cite this

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title = "Communicating judicial retirement",

abstract = "Justices can strategically shape perceptions of their likely retirements, and so influence the President and Senate in choosing an ideologically compatible replacement. Relatively new justices can vote insincerely to affect how their ideologies are perceived, but their strategies are shaped by older justices' expected retirement probabilities. We show that {"}strong messages{"} of retirement are likely when new justices vote insincerely and the new and retiring justices' ideologies are aligned. {"}Weak messages{"} are more likely when new justices vote sincerely or, if they do vote insincerely, the old and new justices' ideologies are unaligned.",

keywords = "Communication, Justices, K10, K30, K40, Messages, Nominations, Retirement, Signaling, Supreme Court",

author = "{\'A}lvaro Bustos and Tonja Jacobi",

note = "Funding Information: We are thankful for comments provided by Ezra Friedman, Peter Dicola and attendees at the 2013 American Law and Economics Association meeting 2013 (Vanderbilt University); the 2014 Latinoamerican Law and Economics Association meeting 2014 (Universidad Francisco Marroqu{\'i}n). Bustos also thanks Fondecyt Grant no. 1141235 for funding. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 Elsevier Inc..",

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doi = "10.1016/j.irle.2015.06.004",

language = "English (US)",

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AU - Bustos, Álvaro

AU - Jacobi, Tonja

N1 - Funding Information: We are thankful for comments provided by Ezra Friedman, Peter Dicola and attendees at the 2013 American Law and Economics Association meeting 2013 (Vanderbilt University); the 2014 Latinoamerican Law and Economics Association meeting 2014 (Universidad Francisco Marroquín). Bustos also thanks Fondecyt Grant no. 1141235 for funding. Publisher Copyright: © 2015 Elsevier Inc..

PY - 2015/8/1

Y1 - 2015/8/1

N2 - Justices can strategically shape perceptions of their likely retirements, and so influence the President and Senate in choosing an ideologically compatible replacement. Relatively new justices can vote insincerely to affect how their ideologies are perceived, but their strategies are shaped by older justices' expected retirement probabilities. We show that "strong messages" of retirement are likely when new justices vote insincerely and the new and retiring justices' ideologies are aligned. "Weak messages" are more likely when new justices vote sincerely or, if they do vote insincerely, the old and new justices' ideologies are unaligned.

AB - Justices can strategically shape perceptions of their likely retirements, and so influence the President and Senate in choosing an ideologically compatible replacement. Relatively new justices can vote insincerely to affect how their ideologies are perceived, but their strategies are shaped by older justices' expected retirement probabilities. We show that "strong messages" of retirement are likely when new justices vote insincerely and the new and retiring justices' ideologies are aligned. "Weak messages" are more likely when new justices vote sincerely or, if they do vote insincerely, the old and new justices' ideologies are unaligned.

KW - Communication

KW - Justices

KW - K10

KW - K30

KW - K40

KW - Messages

KW - Nominations

KW - Retirement

KW - Signaling

KW - Supreme Court

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JF - International Review of Law and Economics

ER -

Communicating judicial retirement

Abstract

Funding

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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