Communication and equilibrium in discontinuous games of incomplete information

Matthew O. Jackson, Leo K. Simon, Jeroen M. Swinkels, William R. Zame

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

72 Scopus citations


This paper offers a new approach to the study of economic problems usually modeled as games of incomplete information with discontinuous payoffs. Typically, the discontinuities arise from indeterminacies (ties) in the underlying problem. The point of view taken here is that the tie-breaking rules that resolve these indeterminacies should be viewed as part of the solution rather than part of the description of the model. A solution is therefore a tie-breaking rule together with strategies satisfying the usual best-response criterion. When information is incomplete, solutions need not exist; that is, there may be no tie-breaking rule that is compatible with the existence of strategy profiles satisfying the usual best-response criteria. It is shown that the introduction of incentive compatible communication (cheap talk) restores existence.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1711-1740
Number of pages30
Issue number5
StatePublished - 2002


  • Auctions
  • Cheap talk
  • Discontinuous games
  • Sharing rules
  • Tie-breaking rules

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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