Communication with endogenous information acquisition

Harry Di Pei*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

I develop a theory of communication in which a sender gathers costly information before giving advice to a receiver. In a general setting, I show that the sender always communicates all her information to the receiver in every equilibrium. In the uniform-quadratic model in which the sender can choose any finite partition as her information structure, an upwardly biased sender can convey more precise information when recommending a larger action.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)132-149
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume160
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015

Keywords

  • Cheap talk
  • Communication
  • Information acquisition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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