@article{50ad7c07342746d7afdd0b45b3e9910b,
title = "Communication with endogenous information acquisition",
abstract = "I develop a theory of communication in which a sender gathers costly information before giving advice to a receiver. In a general setting, I show that the sender always communicates all her information to the receiver in every equilibrium. In the uniform-quadratic model in which the sender can choose any finite partition as her information structure, an upwardly biased sender can convey more precise information when recommending a larger action.",
keywords = "Cheap talk, Communication, Information acquisition",
author = "Pei, {Harry Di}",
note = "Funding Information: I am indebted to Christian Hellwig, Jean Tirole, Robert Gibbons and Juuso Toikka for guidance and support. I thank an associate editor, a referee, Eduardo Azevedo, Patrick Bolton, Jacques Cr{\'e}mer, Glenn Ellison, Paul Heidhues, Johannes H{\"o}rner, Fuhito Kojima, George Lukyanov, Alan Olivi, Heikki Rantakari, Joel Sobel, Birger Wernerfelt, Nils Wernerfelt, Takuro Yamashita, seminar participants at MIT, Toulouse, St. Louis, AEA 2013 for helpful discussions. I am grateful to the financial support from the European Research Council under the European Community's 7th Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 grant agreement N263790 . Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 Elsevier Inc.",
year = "2015",
month = dec,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.011",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "160",
pages = "132--149",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
}