Comparing constitutions: Cohesion and distribution in legislatures

Daniel Diermeier, Timothy J. Feddersen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


This paper summarizes our recent work on analyzing the effects of constitutional features on legislative outcomes and voting behavior. It illustrates how a general framework may be used to examine the effects of one of the principal features of parliamentary democracy: the vote of confidence procedure. We show how the confidence procedure creates incentives for governing coalitions to vote cohesively on policy issues that might otherwise split them. As a consequence, legislative majorities in parliamentary democracies behave in a more disciplined fashion and capture more of the legislative rents than in non-parliamentary settings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)665-672
Number of pages8
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Issue number3-5
StatePublished - 1998


  • Constitutions
  • Legislative bargaining
  • Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Comparing constitutions: Cohesion and distribution in legislatures'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this