'Competition' among employers offering health insurance

David Dranove; Kathryn E. Spier; Laurence Baker

doi:10.1016/S0167-6296(99)00007-7

'Competition' among employers offering health insurance

David Dranove^*, Kathryn E. Spier, Laurence Baker

^*Corresponding author for this work

Strategy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

46 Scopus citations

Abstract

Most employees contribute towards the cost of employer-sponsored insurance, despite tax laws that favor zero contributions. Contribution levels vary markedly across firms, and the average contribution (as a percentage of the premium) has increased over time. We offer a novel explanation for these facts: employers raise contribution levels to encourage their employees to obtain coverage from their spouses' employer. We develop a model to show how the employee contribution required by a given firm depends on characteristics of the firm and its work force, and find empirical support for many of the model's predictions.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	121-140
Number of pages	20
Journal	Journal of Health Economics
Volume	19
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(99)00007-7
State	Published - Jan 2000

Keywords

Employee
Employer
Health insurance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Health Policy
Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1016/S0167-6296(99)00007-7

Cite this

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'Competition' among employers offering health insurance

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

UN SDGs

Access to Document

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