Competitive auctions and digital goods

Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Andrew Wright

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

158 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a class of single round, sealed bid auctions for items in unlimited supply such as digital goods. We focus on auctions that are truthful and competitive. Truthful auctions encourage bidders to bid their utility; competitive auctions yield revenue within a constant factor of the revenue for optimal fixed pricing. We show that for any truthful auction, even a multi-price auction, the expected revenue does not exceed that for optimal fixed pricing. We also give a bound on how far the revenue for optimal fixed pricing can be from the total market utility. We show that several randomized auctions are truthful and competitive under certain assumptions, and that no truthful deterministic auction is competitive. We present simulation results which confirm that our auctions compare favorably to fixed pricing. Some of our results extend to bounded supply markets, for which we also get truthful and competitive auctions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 12th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Pages735-744
Number of pages10
StatePublished - Dec 1 2001
Event2001 Operating Section Proceedings, American Gas Association - Dallas, TX, United States
Duration: Apr 30 2001May 1 2001

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Other

Other2001 Operating Section Proceedings, American Gas Association
CountryUnited States
CityDallas, TX
Period4/30/015/1/01

Keywords

  • Algorithms
  • Management
  • Measurement
  • Performance
  • Theory
  • Verification

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Mathematics(all)

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  • Cite this

    Goldberg, A. V., Hartline, J. D., & Wright, A. (2001). Competitive auctions and digital goods. In Proceedings of the 12th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (pp. 735-744). (Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms).