TY - JOUR
T1 - Conjecture, uncertainty, and cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games. Some experimental evidence
AU - Kahn, Lawrence M.
AU - Murnighan, J. Keith
N1 - Funding Information:
Correspondence to: Professor Lawrence M. Kahn, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 504 East Armory Avenue, Champaign, IL 61820-6297, USA. *Portions of this paper were written while the second author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the National Science Foundation ( #BNS87-00864 and SES88-15566) and the Russell Sage Foundation. The authors thank Patty DeForrest and Felice Herbin for serving as experimenters, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. ‘See Friedman (1986).
PY - 1993/9
Y1 - 1993/9
N2 - This paper presents experimental tests of two models of cooperation in finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma games (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson, 1982). The models suggest that either a perception that the other party may use the tit-for-tat strategy or mutual uncertainty concerning dominant noncooperative strategies can lead to rational cooperation. The experiment independently manipulated both types of uncertainty and allowed for inferences concerning the players' prior, 'homemade' preferences for cooperation. Only in relatively restricted situations did either type of uncertainty promote cooperation. Instead, players cooperated much more than was predicted; they also cooperated more when they were certain of their opponents' payoffs.
AB - This paper presents experimental tests of two models of cooperation in finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma games (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson, 1982). The models suggest that either a perception that the other party may use the tit-for-tat strategy or mutual uncertainty concerning dominant noncooperative strategies can lead to rational cooperation. The experiment independently manipulated both types of uncertainty and allowed for inferences concerning the players' prior, 'homemade' preferences for cooperation. Only in relatively restricted situations did either type of uncertainty promote cooperation. Instead, players cooperated much more than was predicted; they also cooperated more when they were certain of their opponents' payoffs.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=38248998721&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=38248998721&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0167-2681(93)90074-Y
DO - 10.1016/0167-2681(93)90074-Y
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:38248998721
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 22
SP - 91
EP - 117
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
IS - 1
ER -