TY - JOUR
T1 - Constraints and preferences in inductive learning
T2 - An experimental study of human and machine performance
AU - Medin, Douglas L.
AU - Wattenmaker, William D.
AU - Michalski, Ryszard S.
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was supported in part by National Library of Medicine Grant MN04375 and NSF Grant BNS 84-19756 awarded to the first author, and in part by NSF Grant DCR-8406801 and DARPA ONR NOO14-K-85-0878 awarded to the third author. Some of the present research was completed while the third author was a visitor at the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (and was supported in part by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of Naval Research, Contract NtXlOlC80-C-0505). Larry Barsalou. Brian Ross, Mark Gluck, Robert Stepp, Larry Rendell, Renee Baillargeon and Elissa Newport, and three reviewers (Frank Keil, Lyle Bourne. and Kurt Van Lehn) provided constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
PY - 1987
Y1 - 1987
N2 - The paper examines constraints and preferences employed by people in learning decision rules from preclassified examples. Results from four experiments with human subjects were analyzed and compared with artificial intelligence (AI) inductive learning programs. The results showed the people's rule inductions tended to emphasize category validity (probability of some property, given a category) more than cue validity (probability that an entity is a member of a category given that it has some property) to a greater extent than did the AI programs. Although the relative proportions of different rule types (e.g., conjunctive vs. disjunctive) changed across experiments, a single process model provided a good account of the data from each study. These observations are used to argue for describing constraints in terms of processes embodied in models rather than in terms of products or outputs. Thus AI induction programs become candidate psychological process models and results from inductive learning experiments can suggest new algorithms. More generally, the results show that human inductive generalizations tend toward greater specificity than would be expected if conceptual simplicity were the key constraint on inductions. This bias toward specificity may be due to the fact that this criterion both maximizes inferences that may be drawn from category membership and protects rule induction systems from developing over-generalizations.
AB - The paper examines constraints and preferences employed by people in learning decision rules from preclassified examples. Results from four experiments with human subjects were analyzed and compared with artificial intelligence (AI) inductive learning programs. The results showed the people's rule inductions tended to emphasize category validity (probability of some property, given a category) more than cue validity (probability that an entity is a member of a category given that it has some property) to a greater extent than did the AI programs. Although the relative proportions of different rule types (e.g., conjunctive vs. disjunctive) changed across experiments, a single process model provided a good account of the data from each study. These observations are used to argue for describing constraints in terms of processes embodied in models rather than in terms of products or outputs. Thus AI induction programs become candidate psychological process models and results from inductive learning experiments can suggest new algorithms. More generally, the results show that human inductive generalizations tend toward greater specificity than would be expected if conceptual simplicity were the key constraint on inductions. This bias toward specificity may be due to the fact that this criterion both maximizes inferences that may be drawn from category membership and protects rule induction systems from developing over-generalizations.
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U2 - 10.1016/S0364-0213(87)80009-5
DO - 10.1016/S0364-0213(87)80009-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:45949124223
VL - 11
SP - 299
EP - 339
JO - Cognitive Science
JF - Cognitive Science
SN - 0364-0213
IS - 3
ER -