Contracts as Investment Barriers in Unlicensed Spectrum

Yining Zhu, Randall A. Berry

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

By not requiring expensive licenses, unlicensed spectrum lowers the barriers for firms to offer wireless services. However, incumbent firms may still try to erect other entry barriers. For example, recent work has highlighted how customer contracts may be used as one such barrier by penalizing customers for switching to a new entrant. However, this work did not account for another potential benefit of unlicensed spectrum, having access to this open resource may incentivize entrants to invest in new and potentially better technology. This paper studies the interaction of contracts and the incentives of firms to invest in developing new technology. We use a game theoretic model to study this and characterize the effect of contracts on economic welfare. The role of subsidies or taxes by a social planner is also considered.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationINFOCOM 2018 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1925-1933
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781538641286
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 8 2018
Event2018 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2018 - Honolulu, United States
Duration: Apr 15 2018Apr 19 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
Volume2018-April
ISSN (Print)0743-166X

Other

Other2018 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2018
CountryUnited States
CityHonolulu
Period4/15/184/19/18

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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