Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem

William P Rogerson*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

157 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper considers a general version of the hold-up problem where n agents first make relation-specific investments and then must agree on some collective action. It is shown that first-best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)777-794
Number of pages18
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Volume59
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1992

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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