Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem

William P Rogerson

doi:10.2307/2297997

Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem

William P Rogerson^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

199 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper considers a general version of the hold-up problem where n agents first make relation-specific investments and then must agree on some collective action. It is shown that first-best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	777-794
Number of pages	18
Journal	Review of Economic Studies
Volume	59
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2307/2297997
State	Published - Jan 1 1992

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.2307/2297997

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Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem

Abstract

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