The deregulation of the telecommunications industry and its convergence with the broadcasting and computer industries have led to a variety of alliances within the redefined sector. The paper uses recent developments in the economics of a corporate structure to provide some tools for an analysis of these moves. It focuses on the firm's choice of internal organization, boundaries and alliances. After a brief recap of mergers and alliances in the three industries, the paper reviews the three possible motivations for such moves: efficiency, acquisition of market power, and objectives of entrenched managers. It then uses a formal model to provide a definition for the usually loose concept of core competency and to determine a firm's legal boundaries and sphere of influence as a function of its headquarters' ability to oversee activities. Last, it derives some implications of the analysis for the organization of R&D.
|Translated title of the contribution||Corporate structure, R&D and incentives|
|Number of pages||20|
|Journal||Annales des Telecommunications/Annals of Telecommunications|
|State||Published - Jan 1 1995|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering