Cost-minimizing welfare programs

Ronald A. Dye*, Rick Antle

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study opportunities for lowering the cost of welfare programs by exploiting heterogeneity in the unobservable tastes of welfare recipients. Relying on the inability of cash-based programs to achieve self-selection, we provide circumstances in which it is optimal to provide payments-in- kind. Our model differs from other self-selection models because we allow the recipients the opportunity to trade the subsequent to the receipt of their welfare packages. The presence of unreported cash among the recipient population is considered.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)259-265
Number of pages7
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume30
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1986

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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