Coworker complementarity and the stability of top-management teams

Rachel M. Hayes; Paul Oyer; Scott J Schaefer

doi:10.1093/jleo/ewj002

Coworker complementarity and the stability of top-management teams

Rachel M. Hayes^*, Paul Oyer, Scott J Schaefer

^*Corresponding author for this work

Strategy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

55 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the chief executive officer [CEO]) departs We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover increases markedly around times of CEO turnover Further, the magnitude of this increase depends on the relations between the tenure of the manager and tenures of the departing and incoming CEOs Departure of a long-tenured CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a long-tenured non-CEO manager than for a short-tenured manager Succession of a long-tenured manager as CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a short-tenured non-CEO manager than for a long-tenured manager We argue that these findings are at least partially the result of complementarities across these groups of coworkers that affect the value of employment relationships between senior executives and firms.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	184-212
Number of pages	29
Journal	Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Volume	22
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewj002
State	Published - Apr 2006

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Law

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title = "Coworker complementarity and the stability of top-management teams",

abstract = "We analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the chief executive officer [CEO]) departs We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover increases markedly around times of CEO turnover Further, the magnitude of this increase depends on the relations between the tenure of the manager and tenures of the departing and incoming CEOs Departure of a long-tenured CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a long-tenured non-CEO manager than for a short-tenured manager Succession of a long-tenured manager as CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a short-tenured non-CEO manager than for a long-tenured manager We argue that these findings are at least partially the result of complementarities across these groups of coworkers that affect the value of employment relationships between senior executives and firms.",

author = "Hayes, {Rachel M.} and Paul Oyer and Schaefer, {Scott J}",

note = "Funding Information: doi:10.1093/jleo/ewj002 Advance Access publication November 2, 2005 {\textcopyright} The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org We are grateful to the American Compensation Association{\textquoteright}s Emerging Scholars Program and the General Motors Center for Strategy Research at Kellogg for support. Thanks to Charles Him-melberg, Kevin Hallock, three referees, and various seminar participants for comments, and to Kevin Hallock for generously sharing his data on layoff announcements by Fortune 500 firms. This work was completed while Hayes and Schaefer were at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business and the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, respectively. We thank those institutions for their support.",

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doi = "10.1093/jleo/ewj002",

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N1 - Funding Information: doi:10.1093/jleo/ewj002 Advance Access publication November 2, 2005 © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org We are grateful to the American Compensation Association’s Emerging Scholars Program and the General Motors Center for Strategy Research at Kellogg for support. Thanks to Charles Him-melberg, Kevin Hallock, three referees, and various seminar participants for comments, and to Kevin Hallock for generously sharing his data on layoff announcements by Fortune 500 firms. This work was completed while Hayes and Schaefer were at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business and the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, respectively. We thank those institutions for their support.

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N2 - We analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the chief executive officer [CEO]) departs We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover increases markedly around times of CEO turnover Further, the magnitude of this increase depends on the relations between the tenure of the manager and tenures of the departing and incoming CEOs Departure of a long-tenured CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a long-tenured non-CEO manager than for a short-tenured manager Succession of a long-tenured manager as CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a short-tenured non-CEO manager than for a long-tenured manager We argue that these findings are at least partially the result of complementarities across these groups of coworkers that affect the value of employment relationships between senior executives and firms.

AB - We analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the chief executive officer [CEO]) departs We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover increases markedly around times of CEO turnover Further, the magnitude of this increase depends on the relations between the tenure of the manager and tenures of the departing and incoming CEOs Departure of a long-tenured CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a long-tenured non-CEO manager than for a short-tenured manager Succession of a long-tenured manager as CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a short-tenured non-CEO manager than for a long-tenured manager We argue that these findings are at least partially the result of complementarities across these groups of coworkers that affect the value of employment relationships between senior executives and firms.

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Coworker complementarity and the stability of top-management teams

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