Critical Notice of Arthur Ripstein's Force and Freedom

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Ripstein’s Kantian argument for the authority of the state purports to demonstrate that state authority is a necessary condition of each individual’s freedom. Ripstein regards an individual as free just in case her entitlement to control what is hers is not violated. After questioning whether his approach adequately distinguishes standards of legitimacy from standards of ideal justice, I argue for the superiority of an alternative conception of freedom. On the view that I defend a person is free just in case she is able to move her body in space unimpeded by others. I argue that this conception allows for a more convincing version of the Kantian argument.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)549-573
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume41
StatePublished - Dec 2011

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