TY - GEN
T1 - Cross-Network Prioritized Sharing
T2 - 2019 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2019
AU - Zhu, Yining
AU - Yu, Haoran
AU - Berry, Randall A.
AU - Liu, Chang
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was supported in part by NSF grants TWC-1314620, AST-1343381, AST-1547328 and CNS-1701921.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 IEEE.
PY - 2019/4
Y1 - 2019/4
N2 - We analyze the prioritized sharing between an added value Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) and multiple Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). An added value MVNO is one which earns added revenue from wireless users in addition to the revenue it directly collects for providing them wireless service. To offer service, an MVNO needs to contract with one or more MNOs to utilize their networks. Agreeing on such a contract requires the MNOs to consider the impact on their revenue from allowing the MVNO to enter the market as well as the possibility that other MNOs will cooperate. To further protect their customers, the MNOs may prioritize their direct customers over those of the MVNO. We establish a multi-stage game to analyze the equilibrium decisions of the MVNO, MNOs, and users in such a setting. In particular, we characterize the condition under which the MVNO can collaborate with the MNOs. The results show that the MVNO tends to cooperate with the MNOs when the band resources are limited and the added value is significant. When there is significant difference in band resources among the MNOs, the MVNO first considers cooperating with the MNO with a smaller band. We also consider the case when the users also have access to unlicensed spectrum.
AB - We analyze the prioritized sharing between an added value Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) and multiple Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). An added value MVNO is one which earns added revenue from wireless users in addition to the revenue it directly collects for providing them wireless service. To offer service, an MVNO needs to contract with one or more MNOs to utilize their networks. Agreeing on such a contract requires the MNOs to consider the impact on their revenue from allowing the MVNO to enter the market as well as the possibility that other MNOs will cooperate. To further protect their customers, the MNOs may prioritize their direct customers over those of the MVNO. We establish a multi-stage game to analyze the equilibrium decisions of the MVNO, MNOs, and users in such a setting. In particular, we characterize the condition under which the MVNO can collaborate with the MNOs. The results show that the MVNO tends to cooperate with the MNOs when the band resources are limited and the added value is significant. When there is significant difference in band resources among the MNOs, the MVNO first considers cooperating with the MNO with a smaller band. We also consider the case when the users also have access to unlicensed spectrum.
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U2 - 10.1109/INFOCOM.2019.8737636
DO - 10.1109/INFOCOM.2019.8737636
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85068231022
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
SP - 1549
EP - 1557
BT - INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 29 April 2019 through 2 May 2019
ER -