Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks

Amin Rezaei; Yuanqi Shen; Shuyu Kong; Jie Gu; Hai Zhou

doi:10.23919/DATE.2018.8341984

Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks

Amin Rezaei, Yuanqi Shen, Shuyu Kong, Jie Gu, Hai Zhou

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

47 Scopus citations

Abstract

The high cost of IC design has made chip protection one of the first priorities of the semiconductor industry. Although there is a common impression that combinational circuits must be designed without any cycles, circuits with cycles can be combinational as well. Such cyclic circuits can be used to reliably lock ICs. Moreover, since memristor is compatible with CMOS structure, it is possible to efficiently obfuscate cyclic circuits using polymorphic memristor-CMOS gates. In this case, the layouts of the circuits with different functionalities look exactly identical, making it impossible even for an inside foundry attacker to distinguish the defined functionality of an IC by looking at its layout. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive chip protection method based on cyclic locking and polymorphic memristor-CMOS obfuscation. The robustness against state-of-the-art key-pruning attacks is demonstrated and the overhead of the polymorphic gates is investigated.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	85-90
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9783981926316
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE.2018.8341984
State	Published - Apr 19 2018
Event	2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018 - Dresden, Germany Duration: Mar 19 2018 → Mar 23 2018

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018
Volume	2018-January

Other

Other	2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Dresden
Period	3/19/18 → 3/23/18

Funding

This work is partially supported by NSF under CNS1441695, CNS-1651695, and CCF-1533656.

Keywords

Chip Protection
CycSAT Attack
Cyclic Locking
Inside Foundry Attack
Memristor
Obfuscation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
Hardware and Architecture
Software
Information Systems and Management

Access to Document

10.23919/DATE.2018.8341984

Cite this

Rezaei, A., Shen, Y., Kong, S., Gu, J., & Zhou, H. (2018). Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks. In Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018 (pp. 85-90). (Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018; Vol. 2018-January). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE.2018.8341984

Rezaei, Amin ; Shen, Yuanqi ; Kong, Shuyu et al. / Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks. Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 85-90 (Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018).

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title = "Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks",

abstract = "The high cost of IC design has made chip protection one of the first priorities of the semiconductor industry. Although there is a common impression that combinational circuits must be designed without any cycles, circuits with cycles can be combinational as well. Such cyclic circuits can be used to reliably lock ICs. Moreover, since memristor is compatible with CMOS structure, it is possible to efficiently obfuscate cyclic circuits using polymorphic memristor-CMOS gates. In this case, the layouts of the circuits with different functionalities look exactly identical, making it impossible even for an inside foundry attacker to distinguish the defined functionality of an IC by looking at its layout. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive chip protection method based on cyclic locking and polymorphic memristor-CMOS obfuscation. The robustness against state-of-the-art key-pruning attacks is demonstrated and the overhead of the polymorphic gates is investigated.",

keywords = "Chip Protection, CycSAT Attack, Cyclic Locking, Inside Foundry Attack, Memristor, Obfuscation",

author = "Amin Rezaei and Yuanqi Shen and Shuyu Kong and Jie Gu and Hai Zhou",

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Rezaei, A, Shen, Y, Kong, S, Gu, J & Zhou, H 2018, Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks. in Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018. Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018, vol. 2018-January, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 85-90, 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018, Dresden, Germany, 3/19/18. https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE.2018.8341984

Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks. / Rezaei, Amin; Shen, Yuanqi; Kong, Shuyu et al.
Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 85-90 (Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018; Vol. 2018-January).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AU - Gu, Jie

AU - Zhou, Hai

PY - 2018/4/19

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N2 - The high cost of IC design has made chip protection one of the first priorities of the semiconductor industry. Although there is a common impression that combinational circuits must be designed without any cycles, circuits with cycles can be combinational as well. Such cyclic circuits can be used to reliably lock ICs. Moreover, since memristor is compatible with CMOS structure, it is possible to efficiently obfuscate cyclic circuits using polymorphic memristor-CMOS gates. In this case, the layouts of the circuits with different functionalities look exactly identical, making it impossible even for an inside foundry attacker to distinguish the defined functionality of an IC by looking at its layout. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive chip protection method based on cyclic locking and polymorphic memristor-CMOS obfuscation. The robustness against state-of-the-art key-pruning attacks is demonstrated and the overhead of the polymorphic gates is investigated.

AB - The high cost of IC design has made chip protection one of the first priorities of the semiconductor industry. Although there is a common impression that combinational circuits must be designed without any cycles, circuits with cycles can be combinational as well. Such cyclic circuits can be used to reliably lock ICs. Moreover, since memristor is compatible with CMOS structure, it is possible to efficiently obfuscate cyclic circuits using polymorphic memristor-CMOS gates. In this case, the layouts of the circuits with different functionalities look exactly identical, making it impossible even for an inside foundry attacker to distinguish the defined functionality of an IC by looking at its layout. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive chip protection method based on cyclic locking and polymorphic memristor-CMOS obfuscation. The robustness against state-of-the-art key-pruning attacks is demonstrated and the overhead of the polymorphic gates is investigated.

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Y2 - 19 March 2018 through 23 March 2018

ER -

Rezaei A, Shen Y, Kong S, Gu J , Zhou H. Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks. In Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 85-90. (Proceedings of the 2018 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2018). doi: 10.23919/DATE.2018.8341984

Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks

Abstract

Publication series

Other

Funding

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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