TY - JOUR
T1 - Damage Caps and Defensive Medicine
T2 - Reexamination with Patient-Level Data
AU - Moghtaderi, Ali
AU - Farmer, Steven
AU - Black, Bernard
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank participants in workshops at the American Society of Health Economics 2016 Annual Meeting, American Law and Economics Association (2016), Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (2016), Conference on Empirical Legal Studies—Asia (2017), Southern Economics Association (2016), University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, Economics Department, University of Paris II Law School, Michael Frakes and Kosali Simon (discussants), William Sage, and Keith Telster for comments and suggestions. The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute provided funding for this project (5 R01 HL113550).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Cornell Law School and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
PY - 2019/3
Y1 - 2019/3
N2 - Physicians often claim that they practice “defensive medicine,” including ordering extra imaging and laboratory tests, due to fear of malpractice liability. Caps on noneconomic damages are the principal proposed remedy. Do these caps in fact reduce testing, overall health-care spending, or both? We study the effects of “third-wave” damage caps, adopted in the 2000s, on specific areas that are expected to be sensitive to med mal risk: imaging rates, cardiac interventions, and lab and radiology spending, using patient-level data, with extensive fixed effects and patient-level covariates. We find heterogeneous effects. Rates for the principal imaging tests rise, as does Medicare Part B spending on laboratory and radiology tests. In contrast, cardiac intervention rates (left-heart catheterization, stenting, and bypass surgery) do not rise (and likely fall). We find some evidence that overall Medicare Part B rises, but variable results for Part A spending. We find no evidence that caps affect mortality.
AB - Physicians often claim that they practice “defensive medicine,” including ordering extra imaging and laboratory tests, due to fear of malpractice liability. Caps on noneconomic damages are the principal proposed remedy. Do these caps in fact reduce testing, overall health-care spending, or both? We study the effects of “third-wave” damage caps, adopted in the 2000s, on specific areas that are expected to be sensitive to med mal risk: imaging rates, cardiac interventions, and lab and radiology spending, using patient-level data, with extensive fixed effects and patient-level covariates. We find heterogeneous effects. Rates for the principal imaging tests rise, as does Medicare Part B spending on laboratory and radiology tests. In contrast, cardiac intervention rates (left-heart catheterization, stenting, and bypass surgery) do not rise (and likely fall). We find some evidence that overall Medicare Part B rises, but variable results for Part A spending. We find no evidence that caps affect mortality.
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U2 - 10.1111/jels.12208
DO - 10.1111/jels.12208
M3 - Article
C2 - 31839804
AN - SCOPUS:85059694742
SN - 1740-1453
VL - 16
SP - 26
EP - 68
JO - Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
JF - Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
IS - 1
ER -