TY - GEN
T1 - Dealing with Lashkar-e-Taiba
T2 - 2011 1st European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, EISIC 2011
AU - Dickerson, John P.
AU - Mannes, Aaron
AU - Subrahmanian, V. S.
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. With over 100 attacks worldwide since 2004, LeT has become a political force within Pakistan, a proxy fighting force for the Pakistani Army, and a terror group that can carry out complex, coordinated attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic analysis of how to deal with LeT using a 5-player game whose players include LeT, India, the Pakistani military, the (civilian) Pakistani government, and the US. We use an expert on LeT and Pakistan to develop a payoff matrix and compute pure and mixed Nash equilibria (NE) in this payoff matrix. We study several of these NEs in detail. Our analysis shows that: (i) there are 6 pure NEs in which LeT eliminates its armed wing, (ii) increasing external financial/military support for Pakistan leads to no NEs where LeT reduces violence, (iii) almost all NEs in which LeT significantly reduces violence involve coordinated actions by both the US and India.
AB - Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. With over 100 attacks worldwide since 2004, LeT has become a political force within Pakistan, a proxy fighting force for the Pakistani Army, and a terror group that can carry out complex, coordinated attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic analysis of how to deal with LeT using a 5-player game whose players include LeT, India, the Pakistani military, the (civilian) Pakistani government, and the US. We use an expert on LeT and Pakistan to develop a payoff matrix and compute pure and mixed Nash equilibria (NE) in this payoff matrix. We study several of these NEs in detail. Our analysis shows that: (i) there are 6 pure NEs in which LeT eliminates its armed wing, (ii) increasing external financial/military support for Pakistan leads to no NEs where LeT reduces violence, (iii) almost all NEs in which LeT significantly reduces violence involve coordinated actions by both the US and India.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=81255166213&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=81255166213&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/EISIC.2011.33
DO - 10.1109/EISIC.2011.33
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:81255166213
SN - 9780769544069
T3 - Proceedings - 2011 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, EISIC 2011
SP - 354
EP - 359
BT - Proceedings - 2011 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, EISIC 2011
Y2 - 12 September 2011 through 14 September 2011
ER -
