Decentralized advice

Timothy Feddersen*, Ronen Gradwohl

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We compare the amount of information credibly transmitted by cheap talk when information is centralized to one sender and when it is decentralized, with each of several senders holding a distinct but interdependent piece. Under centralization, full information transmission is typically impossible. Under decentralization, however, the number of receivers is decisive: decentralized communication with one receiver is completely uninformative, but decentralized communication with multiple receivers can be fully informative. We analyze the extent of such fully-informative communication, and apply our results to the issue of transparency in advisory committees.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number101871
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
StatePublished - Jun 2020


  • Advice
  • Cheap talk
  • Transparency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

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