Abstract
This paper studies a new strategic auditing game in which atomistic auditors maximize the success rate of audits, and provides a method to calibrate its parameters based on audit data. Calibrating the model to Italian auditing data, we provide an estimate of tax evasion based on (non-random) audit data alone. Counterfactual simulation of the model quantifies the costs and benefits of alternative auditing policies. We compare decentralized enforcement with a counterfactual "commitment policy," and compute the loss from the former.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 35-62 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
Volume | 5 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2013 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
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Dive into the research topics of 'Decentralized deterrence, with an application to labor tax auditing'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Datasets
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Replication data for: Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing
Di Porto, E. (Creator), Persico, N. G. (Creator) & Sahuguet, N. (Creator), ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2013
DOI: 10.3886/e114404, https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/114404
Dataset
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Replication data for: Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing
Di Porto, E. (Creator), Persico, N. G. (Creator) & Sahuguet, N. (Creator), ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2013
DOI: 10.3886/e114404v1, https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/114404/version/V1/view
Dataset