Decision costs and the strategic design of administrative process and judicial review

Pablo T. Spiller, Emerson H. Tiller

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

    36 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    The ability of Congress to structure the institutional costs of agency and judicial decision making gives it considerable control over regulatory policy. We analyze the role of decision costs through models of agency-court interaction and consider the ability of Congress to manipulate such costs for its own policy purposes. We explore the implications of these models by examining recent congressional efforts to change the decision cost structures of agencies and courts. In particular, we consider the so-called Bumpers Amendments of the 1980s and, from the 1990s, the Republican-proposed imposition of cost-benefit analysis on agency decision making.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Number of pages1
    JournalJournal of Legal Studies
    Volume26
    Issue number2 PART I
    StatePublished - Jun 1 1997

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Law

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