We analyze a formal model of decision-making by a deliberative committee. There is a given binary agenda. Individuals evaluate the two alternatives on both private and common interest grounds. Each individual has two sorts of private information going into committee: (a) perfect information about their personal bias and (b) noisy information about which alternative is best with respect to a (commonly held) normative criterion. Prior to a committee vote to choose an alternative, committee members engage in deliberation, modeled as a simultaneous cheap-talk game. We explore and compare equilibrium properties under majority and unanimity voting rules, paying particular attention to the character of debate (who influences who and how) and quality of the decision in each instance. On balance, majority rule induces more information sharing and fewer decision-making errors than unanimity. Furthermore, the influence and character of deliberation per se can vary more under majority rule than under unanimity.
|Title of host publication||Social Choice and Strategic Decisions|
|Subtitle of host publication||Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks|
|Editors||David Austen-Smith, John Duggan|
|Publisher||Springer Berlin Heidelberg|
|Number of pages||48|
|State||Published - 2005|
Austen-Smith, M. D., & Feddersen, T. J. (2005). Deliberation and Voting Rules. In D. Austen-Smith, & J. Duggan (Eds.), Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks (pp. 269-316). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-27295-X_11