Detecting collusion

Robert H. Porter

doi:10.1007/s11151-004-7294-7

Detecting collusion

Robert H. Porter^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

79 Scopus citations

Abstract

Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible. I describe how industrial organization economists diagnose collusion (both explicit and tacit) among firms.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	147-167
Number of pages	21
Journal	Review of Industrial Organization
Volume	26
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-004-7294-7
State	Published - Mar 2005

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Strategy and Management
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Management of Technology and Innovation

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10.1007/s11151-004-7294-7

Cite this

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title = "Detecting collusion",

abstract = "Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible. I describe how industrial organization economists diagnose collusion (both explicit and tacit) among firms.",

author = "Porter, {Robert H.}",

note = "Funding Information: This paper was prepared for a keynote address for the 2004 International Industrial Organization Conference in Chicago. This material also formed the basis of the 2003 Leverhulme Lecture at the University of Warwick, the 2004 Rogers Clark Lecture at North Carolina State University, and a talk at the 2004 Roundtable on Tacit Collusion sponsored by the Canadian Competition Bureau. I am grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support, and to Chris Snyder for his comments.",

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AB - Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible. I describe how industrial organization economists diagnose collusion (both explicit and tacit) among firms.

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Detecting collusion

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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