Abstract
Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible. I describe how industrial organization economists diagnose collusion (both explicit and tacit) among firms.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 147-167 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Review of Industrial Organization |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 2005 |
Funding
This paper was prepared for a keynote address for the 2004 International Industrial Organization Conference in Chicago. This material also formed the basis of the 2003 Leverhulme Lecture at the University of Warwick, the 2004 Rogers Clark Lecture at North Carolina State University, and a talk at the 2004 Roundtable on Tacit Collusion sponsored by the Canadian Competition Bureau. I am grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support, and to Chris Snyder for his comments.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation