Abstract
Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible. I describe how industrial organization economists diagnose collusion (both explicit and tacit) among firms.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 147-167 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Review of Industrial Organization |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1 2005 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation