Detecting collusion

Robert H. Porter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

95 Scopus citations

Abstract

Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible. I describe how industrial organization economists diagnose collusion (both explicit and tacit) among firms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)147-167
Number of pages21
JournalReview of Industrial Organization
Volume26
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2005

Funding

This paper was prepared for a keynote address for the 2004 International Industrial Organization Conference in Chicago. This material also formed the basis of the 2003 Leverhulme Lecture at the University of Warwick, the 2004 Rogers Clark Lecture at North Carolina State University, and a talk at the 2004 Roundtable on Tacit Collusion sponsored by the Canadian Competition Bureau. I am grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support, and to Chris Snyder for his comments.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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