Discretion in reporting managerial performance

Ronald A. Dye; Robert P. Magee

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(91)90003-4

Discretion in reporting managerial performance

Ronald A. Dye^*, Robert P. Magee

^*Corresponding author for this work

Accounting Information and Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a single period agency model in which the agent has some discretion regarding how to report his period's performance, we show when the agent's contract is increasing in his report regardless of the characteristics of his production technology, and how to rank changes in the agent's reporting technology according to the expected cost of compensating the agent.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	359-363
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	35
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90003-4
State	Published - Apr 1991

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(91)90003-4

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title = "Discretion in reporting managerial performance",

abstract = "In a single period agency model in which the agent has some discretion regarding how to report his period's performance, we show when the agent's contract is increasing in his report regardless of the characteristics of his production technology, and how to rank changes in the agent's reporting technology according to the expected cost of compensating the agent.",

author = "Dye, {Ronald A.} and Magee, {Robert P.}",

year = "1991",

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AU - Dye, Ronald A.

AU - Magee, Robert P.

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AB - In a single period agency model in which the agent has some discretion regarding how to report his period's performance, we show when the agent's contract is increasing in his report regardless of the characteristics of his production technology, and how to rank changes in the agent's reporting technology according to the expected cost of compensating the agent.

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DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90003-4

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VL - 35

SP - 359

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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Discretion in reporting managerial performance

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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