Discretion in reporting managerial performance

Ronald A. Dye*, Robert P. Magee

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a single period agency model in which the agent has some discretion regarding how to report his period's performance, we show when the agent's contract is increasing in his report regardless of the characteristics of his production technology, and how to rank changes in the agent's reporting technology according to the expected cost of compensating the agent.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)359-363
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume35
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1991

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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