Discretionary disclosures using a certifier

Iván Marinovic*, Sri S. Sridhar

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies two disclosure regimes when a firm with superior private information must rely on a strategic certifier to disclose credibly its prospects. In the ex ante (ex post) disclosure regime, the firm must decide on whether to hire the certifier before (after) observing the certifier's noisy assessment. Endogenously determined certification fees can actually cause the disclosure probability to decrease in disclosure precision. In the ex ante regime, favorable disclosures are more informative than unfavorable disclosures because of additional positive signaling effect. In the ex post (ex ante) regime, the certifier has incentives to increase (decrease) the disclosure precision.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)25-40
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Accounting and Economics
Volume59
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2015

Keywords

  • Certification
  • Voluntary disclosure

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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