DISTRIBUTIONAL STRATEGIES FOR GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.

Paul R. Milgrom*, Robert J. Weber

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

253 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study games with incomplete information from a point of view which emphasizes the empirical predictions arising from game-theoretic models. Using the notion of 'distributional' strategies, we prove four main theorems: (i) a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem, (ii) a pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem, (iii) a pure-strategy epsilon -equilibrium existence theorem, and (iv) a theorem describing how the set of equilibria of a game varies with the parameters of the game.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)619-632
Number of pages14
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Volume10
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1985

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research

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