DISTRIBUTIONAL STRATEGIES FOR GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.

Paul R. Milgrom; Robert J. Weber

doi:10.1287/moor.10.4.619

DISTRIBUTIONAL STRATEGIES FOR GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.

Paul R. Milgrom^*, Robert J. Weber

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

310 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study games with incomplete information from a point of view which emphasizes the empirical predictions arising from game-theoretic models. Using the notion of 'distributional' strategies, we prove four main theorems: (i) a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem, (ii) a pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem, (iii) a pure-strategy epsilon -equilibrium existence theorem, and (iv) a theorem describing how the set of equilibria of a game varies with the parameters of the game.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	619-632
Number of pages	14
Journal	Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume	10
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.10.4.619
State	Published - 1985

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Mathematics
Computer Science Applications
Management Science and Operations Research

Access to Document

10.1287/moor.10.4.619

Cite this

@article{aab0c6eae8804abbaf2a2096fab72eb6,

title = "DISTRIBUTIONAL STRATEGIES FOR GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.",

abstract = "We study games with incomplete information from a point of view which emphasizes the empirical predictions arising from game-theoretic models. Using the notion of 'distributional' strategies, we prove four main theorems: (i) a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem, (ii) a pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem, (iii) a pure-strategy epsilon -equilibrium existence theorem, and (iv) a theorem describing how the set of equilibria of a game varies with the parameters of the game.",

author = "Milgrom, {Paul R.} and Weber, {Robert J.}",

year = "1985",

doi = "10.1287/moor.10.4.619",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "10",

pages = "619--632",

journal = "Mathematics of Operations Research",

issn = "0364-765X",

publisher = "INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - DISTRIBUTIONAL STRATEGIES FOR GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.

AU - Milgrom, Paul R.

AU - Weber, Robert J.

PY - 1985

Y1 - 1985

N2 - We study games with incomplete information from a point of view which emphasizes the empirical predictions arising from game-theoretic models. Using the notion of 'distributional' strategies, we prove four main theorems: (i) a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem, (ii) a pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem, (iii) a pure-strategy epsilon -equilibrium existence theorem, and (iv) a theorem describing how the set of equilibria of a game varies with the parameters of the game.

AB - We study games with incomplete information from a point of view which emphasizes the empirical predictions arising from game-theoretic models. Using the notion of 'distributional' strategies, we prove four main theorems: (i) a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem, (ii) a pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem, (iii) a pure-strategy epsilon -equilibrium existence theorem, and (iv) a theorem describing how the set of equilibria of a game varies with the parameters of the game.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0022162275&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0022162275&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1287/moor.10.4.619

DO - 10.1287/moor.10.4.619

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0022162275

SN - 0364-765X

VL - 10

SP - 619

EP - 632

JO - Mathematics of Operations Research

JF - Mathematics of Operations Research

IS - 4

ER -

DISTRIBUTIONAL STRATEGIES FOR GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this