Abstract
We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 809-835 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | Experimental Economics |
Volume | 20 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 1 2017 |
Funding
We would like to thank participants of seminars and conferences in Norwich, Rotterdam, Mannheim, Munich, Trier, Fresno, Budapest, Chicago, Zurich, Amsterdam as well as Juan Atal, Ernesto Dal Bó, Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur, Dirk Engelmann, Sacha Kapoor, Martin Kolmar, John Morgan, Felix Vardy, Bauke Visser and two anonymous referees. The authors thank the UC Berkeley Xlab (protocol 2011-04-3183) for financial support. Dana Sisak gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation through Grant PBSGP1-130765.
Keywords
- Cooperation
- Leadership
- Relative performance
- Social preferences
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)