Do prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty?

Alexander Lundberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Next, partial bans on plea bargaining reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions, and the reduction rises with the strength of the ban. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)650-674
Number of pages25
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 2024


  • plea bargain
  • prosecutor behavior
  • wrongful conviction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Business, Management and Accounting
  • Economics and Econometrics


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