Do prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty?

Alexander Lundberg

doi:10.1111/ecin.13203

Do prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty?

Alexander Lundberg^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Emergency Medicine

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Next, partial bans on plea bargaining reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions, and the reduction rises with the strength of the ban. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	650-674
Number of pages	25
Journal	Economic Inquiry
Volume	62
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13203
State	Published - Apr 2024

Keywords

plea bargain
prosecutor behavior
wrongful conviction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Business, Management and Accounting
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1111/ecin.13203

Cite this

@article{d9190e215e55408b949f4dd610e3d944,

title = "Do prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty?",

abstract = "The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Next, partial bans on plea bargaining reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions, and the reduction rises with the strength of the ban. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions.",

keywords = "plea bargain, prosecutor behavior, wrongful conviction",

author = "Alexander Lundberg",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2024 The Authors. Economic Inquiry published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Western Economic Association International.",

year = "2024",

month = apr,

doi = "10.1111/ecin.13203",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "62",

pages = "650--674",

journal = "Economic Inquiry",

issn = "0095-2583",