Do states play welfare games?

David N. Figlio*, Van W. Kolpin, William E. Reid

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

155 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper uses a panel of state-level annual data from 1983 to 1994 for each of the contiguous United States and the District of Columbia, to explore the degree to which states simultaneously set welfare benefits. Using instrumental variables estimation, we find substantial empirical evidence that is supportive of the notion of welfare competition. Furthermore, we find that state responses to neighbor benefit decreases tend to be significantly larger in magnitude as their responses to neighbor benefit increases. Our results, therefore, have potential implications for public policy in the wake of the increased decentralization of welfare policy associated with the welfare reform of 1996.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)437-454
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Urban Economics
Volume46
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1999

Funding

* Corresponding author: David Figlio. An earlier version of this paper appears as Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper 1154-98. We are grateful to Bruce Blonigen, Jan Brueckner, David Card, Julie Berry Cullen, Bill Evans, Jim Hines, Sam Peltzman, David Ribar, Mark Shroder, Joe Stone, Wes Wilson, Jim Ziliak, two anonymous referees, and workshop participants at Indiana University, the Universities of California—San Diego, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, and Oregon, and Washington University (St. Louis) for helpful comments and conversation. Thanks also to Mark Shroder for providing us with some of the data for this project. All errors are our own.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Urban Studies

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