Does tax policy affect executive compensation? Evidence from postwar tax reforms

Carola Frydman, Raven S. Molloy*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The trends in executive pay and labor income tax rates since the 1940s suggest a high elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax policy. By contrast, the level and structure of executive compensation have been largely unresponsive to tax incentives since the 1980s. However, the relative tax advantage of different forms of pay was small during this period. Using a sample of top executives in large firms from 1946 to 2005, we also find a small short run response of salaries, qualified stock options, and bonuses paid after retirement to changes in tax rates on labor income - even though tax rates were significantly higher and more heterogeneous across individuals in the first several decades following WWII. We explore several potential explanations for the conflicting impressions given by the long-run and short-run correlations between taxes and pay, including changes in social norms and concerns about pay equality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1425-1437
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume95
Issue number11-12
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2011

Fingerprint

Tax reform
Executive compensation
Tax rate
Tax policy
Short-run
Labor income
Tax
Large firms
Elasticity
Social norms
Equality
Stock options
Bonuses
Taxable income
Retirement
Second World War
Tax incentives
Salary
Income tax
Executive pay

Keywords

  • Elasticity of taxable income
  • Executive compensation
  • Tax policy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Does tax policy affect executive compensation? Evidence from postwar tax reforms. / Frydman, Carola; Molloy, Raven S.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 95, No. 11-12, 01.12.2011, p. 1425-1437.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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