Double DIP: Re-evaluating security of logic encryption algorithms

Yuanqi Shen; Hai Zhou

doi:10.1145/3060403.3060469

Double DIP: Re-evaluating security of logic encryption algorithms

Yuanqi Shen, Hai Zhou

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

142 Scopus citations

Abstract

Logic encryption is a hardware security technique that uses extra key inputs to lock a given combinational circuit. A recent study by Subramanyan et al. shows that all existing logic encryption techniques can be successfully attacked. As a countermeasure, SARLock was proposed to enhance the security of existing logic encryptions. In this paper, we reevaluate the security of these approaches. A SAT-based attack called Double DIP is proposed and shown to successfully defeat SARLock-enhanced encryptions.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	GLSVLSI 2017 - Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2017
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Pages	179-184
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781450349727
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/3060403.3060469
State	Published - May 10 2017
Event	27th Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI 2017 - Banff, Canada Duration: May 10 2017 → May 12 2017

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI
Volume	Part F127756

Other

Other	27th Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI 2017
Country/Territory	Canada
City	Banff
Period	5/10/17 → 5/12/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Engineering(all)

Access to Document

10.1145/3060403.3060469

Cite this

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title = "Double DIP: Re-evaluating security of logic encryption algorithms",

abstract = "Logic encryption is a hardware security technique that uses extra key inputs to lock a given combinational circuit. A recent study by Subramanyan et al. shows that all existing logic encryption techniques can be successfully attacked. As a countermeasure, SARLock was proposed to enhance the security of existing logic encryptions. In this paper, we reevaluate the security of these approaches. A SAT-based attack called Double DIP is proposed and shown to successfully defeat SARLock-enhanced encryptions.",

author = "Yuanqi Shen and Hai Zhou",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 ACM.; 27th Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI 2017 ; Conference date: 10-05-2017 Through 12-05-2017",

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doi = "10.1145/3060403.3060469",

language = "English (US)",

series = "Proceedings of the ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI",

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Shen, Y & Zhou, H 2017, Double DIP: Re-evaluating security of logic encryption algorithms. in GLSVLSI 2017 - Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2017. Proceedings of the ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI, vol. Part F127756, Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 179-184, 27th Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI 2017, Banff, Canada, 5/10/17. https://doi.org/10.1145/3060403.3060469

Double DIP: Re-evaluating security of logic encryption algorithms. / Shen, Yuanqi; Zhou, Hai.
GLSVLSI 2017 - Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2017. Association for Computing Machinery, 2017. p. 179-184 (Proceedings of the ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI; Vol. Part F127756).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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N2 - Logic encryption is a hardware security technique that uses extra key inputs to lock a given combinational circuit. A recent study by Subramanyan et al. shows that all existing logic encryption techniques can be successfully attacked. As a countermeasure, SARLock was proposed to enhance the security of existing logic encryptions. In this paper, we reevaluate the security of these approaches. A SAT-based attack called Double DIP is proposed and shown to successfully defeat SARLock-enhanced encryptions.

AB - Logic encryption is a hardware security technique that uses extra key inputs to lock a given combinational circuit. A recent study by Subramanyan et al. shows that all existing logic encryption techniques can be successfully attacked. As a countermeasure, SARLock was proposed to enhance the security of existing logic encryptions. In this paper, we reevaluate the security of these approaches. A SAT-based attack called Double DIP is proposed and shown to successfully defeat SARLock-enhanced encryptions.

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Double DIP: Re-evaluating security of logic encryption algorithms

Abstract

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