Doxastic responsibility is owed to others: Against subjectivism

Sanford C. Goldberg

doi:10.5840/jpr201944149

Doxastic responsibility is owed to others: Against subjectivism

Sanford C. Goldberg^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper I argue that Rik Peels’s account of doxastic responsibility (in his 2017 book Responsible Belief) is too subjectivist, as it fails to deliver the correct verdicts in some cases in which one’s responsibilities derive from a social role and where one has misleading higher-order evidence about the first-order evidence. The take-home point is that the notion of responsibility in doxastic responsibility is something that is owed to others.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	63-77
Number of pages	15
Journal	Journal of Philosophical Research
Volume	44
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr201944149
State	Published - Jan 1 2019

Keywords

Answerability
Doxastic responsiblity
Higher-order evidence
Normative defeat
Responsible belief
Rik Peels

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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10.5840/jpr201944149

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KW - Normative defeat

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Doxastic responsibility is owed to others: Against subjectivism

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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