Doxastic responsibility is owed to others: Against subjectivism

Sanford C. Goldberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper I argue that Rik Peels’s account of doxastic responsibility (in his 2017 book Responsible Belief) is too subjectivist, as it fails to deliver the correct verdicts in some cases in which one’s responsibilities derive from a social role and where one has misleading higher-order evidence about the first-order evidence. The take-home point is that the notion of responsibility in doxastic responsibility is something that is owed to others.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)63-77
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Philosophical Research
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019


  • Answerability
  • Doxastic responsiblity
  • Higher-order evidence
  • Normative defeat
  • Responsible belief
  • Rik Peels

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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