Durable-good monopoly with inventories

Asher Wolinsky*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper points out that familiar strategic considerations may induce a durable good monopolist to hold inventories. The motive for inventory holding by the monopoly is the standard one of production smoothing, but it arises here due to strategic considerations which induce the durable good monopoly to sell uneven quantities over time.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)339-343
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume37
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1991

Funding

+ Support from the NSF is gratefully acknowledged. ’ The extensive literature on the strategic considerations faced by a durable good monopolist includes Coase (1972), Stokey (19801, Bulow (1982), Kahn (1985), and GUI, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1984). ’ The existing literature explains inventory holding either as a means of production smoothing in the face of random shocks to productivity or demand [see, e.g., Zabel (1970, 1971) and Kahn (1987)], or as a disciplining device which maintains oligopolistic collusion [see Rothemberg and Saloner (1987) and Saloner (198611.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Durable-good monopoly with inventories'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this