Dynamic games with side information in economic networks

Ceyhun Eksin*, Pooya Molavi, Alejandro Ribeiro, Ali Jadbabaie

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a dynamic game with payoff externalities. Agents' utility depends on an unknown true state of the world and actions of everyone in the network. Each agent has an initial private information about the underlying state and repeatedly observes actions of its neighbors. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents' actions and beliefs in a connected network when it is common knowledge that the agents are myopic and rational. Given a quadratic payoff function, we provide a new proof for an existing result that claims almost sure consensus in actions asymptotically. Given consensus in actions, we show that agents have the same mean estimate of the true state of the world in the limit. We justify these results in a numerical example motivated by a socio-economic scenario.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationConference Record of the 46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012
Pages520-524
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2012
Event46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012 - Pacific Grove, CA, United States
Duration: Nov 4 2012Nov 7 2012

Publication series

NameConference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers
ISSN (Print)1058-6393

Conference

Conference46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012
CountryUnited States
CityPacific Grove, CA
Period11/4/1211/7/12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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