Dynamic games with side information in economic networks

Ceyhun Eksin; Pooya Molavi; Alejandro Ribeiro; Ali Jadbabaie

doi:10.1109/ACSSC.2012.6489059

Dynamic games with side information in economic networks

Ceyhun Eksin^*, Pooya Molavi, Alejandro Ribeiro, Ali Jadbabaie

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a dynamic game with payoff externalities. Agents' utility depends on an unknown true state of the world and actions of everyone in the network. Each agent has an initial private information about the underlying state and repeatedly observes actions of its neighbors. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents' actions and beliefs in a connected network when it is common knowledge that the agents are myopic and rational. Given a quadratic payoff function, we provide a new proof for an existing result that claims almost sure consensus in actions asymptotically. Given consensus in actions, we show that agents have the same mean estimate of the true state of the world in the limit. We justify these results in a numerical example motivated by a socio-economic scenario.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Conference Record of the 46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012
Pages	520-524
Number of pages	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ACSSC.2012.6489059
State	Published - 2012
Event	46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012 - Pacific Grove, CA, United States Duration: Nov 4 2012 → Nov 7 2012

Publication series

Name	Conference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers
ISSN (Print)	1058-6393

Conference

Conference	46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012
Country/Territory	United States
City	Pacific Grove, CA
Period	11/4/12 → 11/7/12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Signal Processing
Computer Networks and Communications

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10.1109/ACSSC.2012.6489059

Cite this

Eksin, C., Molavi, P., Ribeiro, A., & Jadbabaie, A. (2012). Dynamic games with side information in economic networks. In Conference Record of the 46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012 (pp. 520-524). Article 6489059 (Conference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers). https://doi.org/10.1109/ACSSC.2012.6489059

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title = "Dynamic games with side information in economic networks",

abstract = "We consider a dynamic game with payoff externalities. Agents' utility depends on an unknown true state of the world and actions of everyone in the network. Each agent has an initial private information about the underlying state and repeatedly observes actions of its neighbors. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents' actions and beliefs in a connected network when it is common knowledge that the agents are myopic and rational. Given a quadratic payoff function, we provide a new proof for an existing result that claims almost sure consensus in actions asymptotically. Given consensus in actions, we show that agents have the same mean estimate of the true state of the world in the limit. We justify these results in a numerical example motivated by a socio-economic scenario.",

author = "Ceyhun Eksin and Pooya Molavi and Alejandro Ribeiro and Ali Jadbabaie",

year = "2012",

doi = "10.1109/ACSSC.2012.6489059",

language = "English (US)",

isbn = "9781467350518",

series = "Conference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers",

pages = "520--524",

booktitle = "Conference Record of the 46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012",

note = "46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012 ; Conference date: 04-11-2012 Through 07-11-2012",

}

Eksin, C, Molavi, P, Ribeiro, A & Jadbabaie, A 2012, Dynamic games with side information in economic networks. in Conference Record of the 46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012., 6489059, Conference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, pp. 520-524, 46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012, Pacific Grove, CA, United States, 11/4/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACSSC.2012.6489059

Dynamic games with side information in economic networks. / Eksin, Ceyhun; Molavi, Pooya; Ribeiro, Alejandro et al.
Conference Record of the 46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012. 2012. p. 520-524 6489059 (Conference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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T1 - Dynamic games with side information in economic networks

AU - Eksin, Ceyhun

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AU - Ribeiro, Alejandro

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N2 - We consider a dynamic game with payoff externalities. Agents' utility depends on an unknown true state of the world and actions of everyone in the network. Each agent has an initial private information about the underlying state and repeatedly observes actions of its neighbors. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents' actions and beliefs in a connected network when it is common knowledge that the agents are myopic and rational. Given a quadratic payoff function, we provide a new proof for an existing result that claims almost sure consensus in actions asymptotically. Given consensus in actions, we show that agents have the same mean estimate of the true state of the world in the limit. We justify these results in a numerical example motivated by a socio-economic scenario.

AB - We consider a dynamic game with payoff externalities. Agents' utility depends on an unknown true state of the world and actions of everyone in the network. Each agent has an initial private information about the underlying state and repeatedly observes actions of its neighbors. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents' actions and beliefs in a connected network when it is common knowledge that the agents are myopic and rational. Given a quadratic payoff function, we provide a new proof for an existing result that claims almost sure consensus in actions asymptotically. Given consensus in actions, we show that agents have the same mean estimate of the true state of the world in the limit. We justify these results in a numerical example motivated by a socio-economic scenario.

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Dynamic games with side information in economic networks

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